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FACTORS IN GRANTING MOTOR CARRIER CER-
TIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
AND NECESSITY
JOHN J. GEORGE*
Public motor transportation today has assumed enormous
proportions. Evidence of this is found in the fact that seven
thousand companies are operating 35,000 vehicles over 233,000
miles of route, carrying 21/2 billion passengers a year, at a
revenue of over 300 millions dollars.
This form of public service enterprise is authorized by a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity, issued by the state
utility commission (or similar agency). The many and varied
factors affecting the granting of this certificate are revealed in
the voluminous decisions of the commissions and courts.
In a general sense the only factor involved is public con-
venience and necessity and on this ground, as was expressed in
the Washington Railway and Electric case,' there is an accepted
standard among commissions of allowing certificates when pub-
lic convenience and necessity justifies.
Before taking up the question of what factors determine the
granting of certificates of "public convenience and necessity,"
let us consider the meaning of the phrase, whether it is to be
construed as a unit, and whether qualified or absolute public
convenience and necessity must exist. Here we have a phrase
which lends itself to vagueness, obscureness, indefiniteness and
uncertainty. While it has been current not so long or widely as
"police power," "due process" or "equal protection," it has
proved itself no less mystic, exact or tangible.
What is the meaning of public, the first word of the phrase?
The Colorado supreme court interpreted it to mean "not all the
* See p. 280 for biographical note.
I p. U. R., 1922C, 757.
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people all the time," but said that a service affecting a sufficient
part of the public as is affected by any other service known as
public is to be dealt with as a public service. 2
Thus a standard of comparing the unknown quality with the
known quality determines the recognizable quality of the un-
known. This definition of what is public may serve in practical
situations; however, the risk of great error arises in choosing
that with which the comparison is to be made, and especially so
in deciding upon the degree of similarity which must exist before
the satisfactory resemblance can be established. A broader and
more inclusive meaning was given by the Oklahoma supreme
court: "Public pertains to the people of a nation, state or com-
munity at large, the general body, indefinitely, or as a whole
or entirety."3
The Oklahoma interpretation is as comprehensive as the Colo-
rado is involved. Neither is precise; both are inexact. These
decisions can be taken as illustrative of the impossibility of
prescribing definite limits to the term public; they show also the
inevitability of having to determine each case as it arises. Some-
times there is a tendency to interpret the term narrowly, even in
a particular case, it having been declared that the wish of the
applicant is not the wish of the public, does not amount to pub-
lic convenience and necessity, and therefore does not constitute
sufficient grounds for granting certificate. 4
Likewise, a good deal of doubt has arisen as to the meaning of
"convenience and necessity." "Convenient" is not "handy," nor
does it mean easily accessible, said the Rhode Island supreme
court,r though "ease and access may enter into" convenience. A
service is convenient when it is "necessary for public accommo-
dation." It was here held that a commission in granting a cer-
tificate must be convinced that the proposed service will accom-
modate the public and that a reasonable public demand exists.
The same case exhibits the view of the court that "necessity"
does not mean absolutely indispensable, but reasonably indispen-
sable. This interpretation is much in accord with that expressed
in the Rock Island case, where "necessity" did not mean "essen-
tial or absolutely indispensable," but the resulting condition
where the proposed service would be such an improvement in
2 Davis v. Colorado, 247 Pacific 801.
3 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Oklahoma, decided September 14,
1926, and reported in N. A. R. & U. Com. Bulletin 73, 1926.
4Pacific States Express (Calif.), P. U. R., 1922D, 302.
5 Abbott v. Pub. Utils. Com, 136 AtI. 490; see Bus Age, May, 1927, 34.
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the existing mode of transportation as to justify the expense of
making the improvement. 6
Is the expression "convenience and necessity" to be construed
as a unit or are the two words to be construed separately? An
early opinion in the matter was rendered by the New York
public service commission to the effect that the phrase as used in
the statute is not to be divided; that "if an enterprise is neces-
sary, it is certainly convenient, so that if it be required that a
general necessity be established, the word convenience would be
superfluous." "Convenience is connected with the word 'neces-
sity' not as an additional requirement, but to modify what other-
wise might be taken as the significance of necessity."1 The com-
mission parallels the interpretation of "convenience and neces-
sity" to Marshall's interpretation of "necessary and proper" in
the McCulloch case, stating that to analyze each word separately
and to give a separate meaning to each would be a marked de-
parture from the ordinary process of the human mind. Six
years later this commission reiterated its former view that the
words must be considered as an entity and not separately.8 The
New York interpretation has been accepted in Colorado, Ken-
tucky, Missouri, and Montana. 9 In 1926 the Oklahoma supreme
court leaned heavily towards the New York view, 10 which found
acceptance by the Utah commission in 1927."1 This agency
admitted that while public convenience would be served by
granting the certificate sought, public necessity did not so
demand, and accordingly denied the certificate.
The evident conclusion therefore is that the phrase "con-
venience and necessity" must be taken together, and that the
words are not to be construed separately. Also that both con-
venience and necessity must exist from the standpoint of the
public before the issuance of the certificate is warranted.
Is the convenience and necessity provided for in the statutes
interpreted by the commissions to mean absolute or qualified con-
0 Note 3.
7Re Troy Auto Car Co., P. U. R., 1917A, 700, 706, 707.
s Re Aldrich, P. U. R., 1923A, 392-4.
ORe Overland Motor Express Co. (Colo.), P. U. M, 1920B, 555; Red
Star Transportation Co. v. Red Dot Coach Lines (Ky. Ct. of App.), 295
S. W. 419; Billings-Sheridan Bus Line (Mont.), P. U. R., 1928B, 816;
Re McCartney (Mo.), P. U. R., 1928C, 182. Although the Kentucky statute
phraseology is "convenience or necessity" (italics mine), the court in the
above case held that the meaning is "convenience and necessity."
10 Note 3.
11 Re Sumner, P. U. PL, 1927C2, xiii.
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venience and necessity? The New York commission in 1917
dealt with this question.' 2 Here the view was taken that public
convenience and necessity exists "when the proposed facility will
meet a reasonable want of the public, and supply a need, if exist-
ing facilities while in some sense sufficient do not adequately
supply that need." The Colorado commission has had extensive
experience on this point. In 1920 it was decided that as the ap-
plicant who had secured the first certificate to operate a motor
truck line between Denver and Boulder had not been required to
prove the existence of absolute necessity, the applicant for a
second and competing certificate was entitled to receive it on
establishing reasonable necessity. 13 Although there were two
railways and one motor truck line doing freight and express
business between the two points, the commission granted a cer-
tificate for a second truck line, witnesses for applicant testifying
that such would improve the service. Not indispensability to
public demand, but only a reasonable need is required to justify
the increasing of public convenience, ruled this commission in
1921.14 Two years later the commission stated that the needs
justifying the issue of a certificate are not required to be an
absolute demand from the public, but only such as will be rea-
sonably convenient to the public.15 In a further case, it was
likewise held that reasonable convenience and necessity is suffi-
cient, but reasonable convenience and necessity of the public in
general, and not of any particular locality; such is the contem-
plation of the Colorado statute.16 "Necessity" can be read to
mean only "reasonably indispensable," declared the Oklahoma
supreme court in the Rock Island case.' 0
In the light of administrative practice "convenience and neces-
sity" has been interpreted to possess a qualified meaning only.
The statutes, it is safe to conclude, meant to require no absolute
necessity and convenience; and had they aimed otherwise, it
would be difficult to see how they could be applied in practice.
We now turn to a consideration of the factors which deter-
mine the existence of public convenience and necessity justifying
the granting of a motor carrier certificate.
12 Note 7.
'3 Note 9.
14 Re Donovan (Colorado), P. U. R., 1921D, 493.
15 Re Carver, P. U. R., 1923B, 242.
16 Re Paradox Land and Transport Co., P. U. R., 1923E, 759. Like-
wise Missouri.
17 Note 3.
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1. ABSENCE OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
In the Middle and Far West has appeared emphatically the
absence of transportation facilities as a factor in determining
the issuance of certificates. As might be expected, this condi-
tion serves as an evident justification for authorizing motor
carrier service.
The fact that one community has become accustomed to the
advantages of motor carrier service suffices as proper basis for
granting a certificate to serve a nearby community hitherto with-
out service, although in so doing the commission will be creating
competition with another operator on part of the proposed
route.' In the absence of transportation service for a com-
munity newly built up, public convenience and necessity justifies
the authorization of service by motor carrier, ruled the Colorado
commission, 19 and the same body has declared that where rail-
way service has been abandoned between two towns, the daily
average of mail, freight, and express being 600 pounds and a
monthly average of 300 passengers, convenience and necessity
demanded the authorization of motor carrier operation.20
Furnishing cross-country service and supplying connections
to railways are adequate grounds for issuing a certificate in
South Dakota. 21 Here not urban, but rural needs are recog-
nized. Similarly, in the same state the absence of other trans-
portation facilities for inland towns makes them dependent on
motor carrier service, and a certificate will issue.22 The South
Dakota Commission has further concluded that where the rail-
way distance is 700 miles, reaching the point by a proposed bus
route of 120 miles is easily within the meaning of public con-
venience and necessity. 28
The importance of motor service to communities not served
by rail lines has been pointed out by an assistant Secretary of
18Re Shepard (Ind. P. S. Com.), 590-M, February 5, 1926.
19 Re Denver & SoutA Platte Transportation Co., Decision 976, May 7,
1926.
20 Re Heck (Colorado P. U. Com.), Decision 986, May 13, 1925.
21 Re Heaton, Order 878, June 9, 1926.
22 Re Linden, P. U. R., 1926D, 782.
23 Re Buffalo Motor Co., P. U. R., 1927C, 398-400. Where certificate of
operator who gave inadequate service had been canceled, an applicant whose
petition was endorsed by such bodies as chambers of commerce along the
route secured the certificate. Ex Parte Vincent (La. P. S. Com.), P. U. R.,
1928C, 180.
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Commerce,24 who states that 45,000 such communities have been
put into touch with rail transportation by means of the motor
carrier.
2. ADEQUACY OF SERVICE
Commissions often take the existing means of transportation
as the index ;25 Ohio furnishes an excellent example in Eager 'V.
Public Utilities Commission.26 In 1925 several states, chiefly in
the northeast, enacted statutes authorizing railroads to engage
in the motor carrier business.27 Adequacy and frequency of
service have been emphasized by the Illinois supreme court in
Egyptian Transportation Co. v. L. & N. Ry.28 Demands and
requests from the public generally that transportation service
be furnished by applicant, and the inability of existing agencies
to supply necessary service or that these agencies do not supply
it are in Pennsylvania satisfactory evidence that public con-
venience and necessity exists.29 "Sustained and growing patron-
age" suffices in Indiana.30 Inconvenience to the public resulting
from the lack of the proposed service is a proper standard of
measurement in Oklahoma.31 The development of bus trans-
portation to large proportions in a short time is distinct and
ample evidence that public convenience and necessity demands
motor transportation, the Missouri commission ruled recently.3 2
A county ordinance seeking to bar motor service from the county
is satisfactory evidence of the need for such service, it has been
held in California. Positive, affirmative testimony is essential
to the establishing of public convenience and necessity in
Arizona, 33 and while the testimony of county commissioners in
24 J. Walter Drake, cited by A. J. Brosseau in address before Bus Divi-
sion, Philadelphia, June 15, 1927.
25Lilienthal and Rosenbaum in Journal of Land and Public Utility
Economics, July, 1926. The Missouri Commission stressed this point in
December, 1927. Re Midwest Transit Co., P. U. R., 1928C, 319.
26 149 N. E. 865.
27 Note 25.
28 152 N. E. 510; 321 Ill. 580.
29 Re Eckroth (Pa.), P. U. R., 1926A, 358.
80 Re Hiner's Red Ball Lines, Inc., P. U. R., 1926A, 133-4.
31 Note 3. Because the manufacture of explosives is an economic benefit
to a community, Arizona has granted a certificate to haul them. Re Apache
Truck Line, P. U. R., 1923A, 220.
32 Re Purple Swan Safety Coach Line, P. U. R., 1928A, 200.
33 Jerome-Union Stage Line, P. U. R.; 1922E, 850. Same year California
stressed indispensability of clear evidence on adequacy of existing service,
P. U. R., 1922D, 495.
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Colorado is weighty, it is not determinative in establishing public
need. 34
The Indiana commission has denied a certificate where ap-
plicant failed to have representatives of the towns on proposed
route introduce evidence that public convenience and necessity
demanded motor service.3 5 But where only a petition signed by
inhabitants along a proposed route merely stated that public
convenience and necessity would be served and averred no in-
adequacy of existing service, the certificate was denied in Mon-
tana.36  An applicant in Missouri has secured a certificate in
the absence of evidence convincing the commission that the other
applicant would furnish better service.3 7 The fact that the com-
mission records show that service previously authorized on the
route had proved a failure, and the failure of the evidence offered
in the application at hand to show sufficiently improved condi-
tions, warranted the denial of the certificate in Washington. 38
Many considerations have been ruled out as insufficient fac-
tors. An occasional request to establish service or an opinion
that such would be justified will not suffice in Pennsylvania. 9
Nor will simply stating in application that public convenience
warrants without supporting facts in Colorado40 or Arizona.41
Merely stating that present service is inadequate cannot be con-
sidered as proper evidence in Arizona, 42 and the same view was
expressed in Colorado. 43 The business realized the first day or
week is not a sufficient basis to determine the granting of a cer-
tificate in Indiana.44
Testimony offered by witnesses at hearings will not be con-
sidered sufficient in Ohio, 45 and in Illinois the ability of a rail-
way to furnish the service which is needed precludes the grant-
ing of a certificate to a non-rail carrier.46 And the testimony of
two passengers who rode in a particular vehicle that public con-
35 Re Frurip Bros. Bus Line, P. U. R., 1927C, 398.
34 Re Townsend, P. U. R., 1928A, 175.
36 Billings-Sheridan Bus Line (Mont.), P. U. R., 1928B, 816.
37 Re Packard, P. U. R., 19280, 189. Decided February 29, 1928.
38 Re Olympia-Tacoma Auto Freight Line, P. U. R., 19280, 117.
39 Note 29.
40 Re Walker (Col. P. S. Com.), decided December 2, 1926.
41 Note 33.
42 Note 33.
43 Note 40.
44 Note 30.
45 Note 26.
46 Note 28.
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venience and necessity demanded the operation of factory-built
cars in the motor service was deemed invalid by the California
commission on the ground, it seems, that these witnesses were
not acquainted with regular stage equipment.47
Does the element of futurity enter into determining whether
public convenience and necessity shall warrant a certificate? At
least one statute has recognized this element in providing for
the issuance of certificates which will take care of future needs.48
This provision in anticipating future needs marks itself as de-
cidedly progressive.
A few of the commission decisions reveal a recognition of the
element of futurity. In California, a certificate has been denied
where the applicant failed to show among other things merely
the inadequacy of existing facilities to take care of more than
present traffic.49 Arizona5° has recognized futurity and Wyo-
ming has emphasized it. 51
In Indiana, a thinly populated area bordering on a highway
does not constitute necessity for motor carrier service, although
there are prospects for building up some of the communities in
the area. Perhaps the strongest emphasis has been put on
futurity by the authorities in Washington. 52 To decide whether
a certificate shall be granted or not the commission of that state
has authority to look to the future as well as to the present.
Such is not unfair or arbitrary action, the state supreme court
has held, because the motor carrier offers a service which the
rail carrier cannot furnish. The recent Missouri act authorizes
the certificate on basis of either present or future needs.
It is significant that the weight of evidence in favor of recog-
nizing the element of futurity comes from the Far West, areas
in which the transportation systems are not so fixedly developed,
and areas which consequently look to the further needs and
means of transportation.
47 Re Hempstead, 1922D, 489.
48 Utah Public Utilities Act of 1917, as amended 1919, Sec. 4818.
49 Note 47. Italics are mine.
5 0 Re Phoenix Motor Coach, P. U. R., 1925E, 344.
51 Salt Creek Transportation Co. v. Apgar, P. U. PL, 1926A, 120.
52 For Indiana case, see Re Gary.Ry. Co. (Ind.), Decision 587-M, May
7, 1926. For the Washington view of futurity as an element in public con-
venience and necessity, see Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Public
Works (Washington Sup. Ct), 256 Pacific 333, decided May 31, 1927.
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3. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING SERVICE
Frequently the statutes direct or authorize the commission
to grant certificates only when existing service is inadequate. 5 3
Inadequacy of existing transportation service as grounds for a
certificate has been passed upon in sixteen states,5 4 Thirty-three
cases have been decided, in fourteen of which the certificate has
issued; it has been denied in nineteen. For the purpose of con-
sidering the transportation agencies involved, these cases can be
divided into several classes.
In the first class we have the applicant seeking a certificate
to operate motor service in competition with a rail carrier. A
railroad schedule so designed as not even to encourage short
hauls between intermediate small towns entitled the applicant to
a motor carrier certificate to serve those towns, ruled the Illinois
commission.55 The commission here contrasted the frequency
of proposed service to the infrequency of existing rail service.
The failure of a railroad to operate efficiently the facilities it
has is proper grounds for granting a motor carrier a competitive
certificate, especially where the motor service will be practically
equivalent to express service.5 6 Railway service of only two
trains a day warrants authorizing motor service, which however
must not interfere with traffic of the railway in those areas
which are properly served.57 Time saved by eliminating rehan-
dling of goods, and the failure of the rail carrier to furnish ade-
quate refrigeration and heated-car facilities were adjudged
valid grounds for granting a competitive motor carrier certifi-
cate in South Dakota.5 8
Discontinuance of service by an interurban electric line prop-
erly results in granting a certificate to a motor carrier, although
he will compete with a railroad.5 9
53 For example, Ohio General Code, 614-87; Kentucky Act of March 5,
1926, Sec. 3; Indiana, Moorhead Bus Act of 1925, Sec. 2; Minnesota, Laws
of 19,5, Ch. 185, Sec. 8; and Texas, Laws of 1927, Ch. 270, Sec. 7.
54 Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah.
55 Re Cannon Ball Coach Line, Decision 14589, December 8, 1926.
B6Re Rex (Calif.), P. U. R., 1920B, 675.
57 Re Gaiser (N. Y.), P. U. R., 1920B, 246.
as Re Gray, P. U. R., 1928B, 659.
59 Re Gold Star Line (Ill.), decided March 9, 1927.
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A railway in discontinuing some of its trains creates thereby
a condition warranting motor carrier service in competition
therewith, concluded the Indiana commission. 60
Proof that trucks and passenger vehicles can furnish adequate
service more economically than can the railway has constituted
sufficient reason to authorize motor service in New Hampshire. 61
In this decision, it seemed that the commission looked upon the
adequacy and cost of service to be furnished as the measure of
the extent to which such service will be authorized.
The Ohio supreme court has taken the ground that under the
statute the commission must allow existing utilities the oppor-
tunity to make adequate the inadequate existing service, and
only when they cannot or do not, may the commission grant a
certificate to someone else.62 Here the commission order allow-
ing addition of equipment, and change in time and rate schedule
was protested as not justified by necessity and the court sustain-
ing this protest, reversed the commission order.
But he who seeks a certificate to compete with an established
transportation agency assumes the burden of proving the in-
adequacy of existing service, ruled the Oklahoma supreme court
in 1926,03 and the same view was stressed by the Ohio commis-
sion early in 1927. 64
What constitutes adequate service? In Pennsylvania, an
electric line offering a ten-minute schedule from 5:50 A. M. to
7:30 P. M., with slightly greater intervals thereafter, was ad-
judged furnishing an adequate service; 65 and a railway schedule
of six trains daily has been considered ample service in Mon-
tana.66 But where there were eighteen trains daily each way,
the New York commission has authorized bus service, the ap-
plicant admitting that train service was adequate for those who
wanted to use it.67
60 Re Indiana Motor Transport Co., 653-M, April 9, 1926.
61Boston & Maine Transportation Co. (N. H.), Order 1719, July .0,
1925.
62Sciota Valley Railway & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 154
N. E. 320; P. U. R. 1927C, 186.
63 Note 3.
64 Salisbury Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1927C, 611.
65 Southern Pennsylvania Traction Co. v. Hartel, P. U. R., 1917A, 630.
66 Re Bennett, P. U. R., 19270, 595.
67 Re International Bus Corp., P. U. R., 1927A, 346. Italics are mine.
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The satisfaction of shippers 6s with existing railway service,
and the inability to maintain the present sufficient train service
were motor carrier operation authorized,6 9 are considered in-
dices to adequate service in North Dakota and Rhode Island
respectively.
Secondly, we have the applicant seeking a certificate to com-
pete with both railroad and existing motor carriers. The Cal-
ifornia experience furnishes an illustration. Where three stage
lines and a railway were operating between Oceanside and Los
Angeles, the commission refused a certificate to one Hoxie, who
held a contract for carrying. the mail, concluding that con-
venience and necessity did not demand the establishing of a
passenger and baggage service in connection with mail trans-
portation.70
Iowa has refused a certificate to operate motor carrier service
because to do so would interfere indirectly with rail carrier and
motor carrier. Proposed route would not be directly competitive
with either carrier, but inasmuch as the applicant would lessen
the business of the established carriers his application was
denied. 7 1
In class three is placed the railway seeking a certificate to
operate motor service. Insufficient facilities for transporting
passengers between Normal and Bloomington, and the desire for
transfers between the lines constitute convenience and necessity
and justify the granting of a certificate to a street railway in
Illinois.7 2 But public safety and economy in operation demand
that a railway "stick to its rails" and not embark in motor car-
rier service, declared the New Hampshire commission. 73
In class four appears the applicant for motor carrier certificate
to operate in competition with existent motor carrier service.
Time was when his task was a relatively easy one. Recently,
6s Re Fargo-Moorhead Trucking Co., P. U. R., 1927A, 459.
69 Re Aselton, P. U. R., 1926E, 370.
70 P. U. R., 1920B, 674. See also Colorado commission decision in Re
Elliott, P. U. R., 1926A, 380, where a certificate was denied because existing
service as furnished by motor carrier and train were considered adequate.
71 Re Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1926C, 19.
72 Illinois Power and Light Corporation (Ill. Com. Com.), Dec., 14936,
May 26, 1926.
73 Re B. & M. Bus Application, N. A. R. & U. Com. Bulletin 65, 1926.
A statute of 1925 allows street railways to enter motor service. This de-
cision indicates a rigid interpretation, the steam road being denied a cer-
tificate.
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multiplicity of operators over the same route was particularly
noticeable in states like Kentucky and Ohio. Perhaps as little
difficulty existed in Indiana in regard to securing a competing
certificate, as in any of the states with a motor carrier problem.
Between Indianapolis and Terre Haute two steam lines oper-
ate, and also an electric line; yet the commission has authorized
two motor carrier lines between the same two cities. Compet-
ing certificates will issue in Kentucky, the burden of proof being
decidedly on the applicant. Consolidation in Kentucky is rapidly
imposing practical checks on granting of competing certificates.
In Illinois the statute guards against a monopoly in the motor
carrier business.1 4 Competing certificates will issue where it
can be shown that the public will be greatly convenienced there-
by.7 5 Competing certificates will issue in Arizona if the existing
utility does not furnish proper service7 6
Under the statute and the decisions it is practically impossible
for an applicant to secure a competing certificate in Ohio unless
the established carrier cares so little for his interests as not to
keep or make the service adequate. 77 In the last two years quite
a few of the states of the Northeast have enacted statutes favor-
ing railway procuring of certificates for motor service and some
of the states of the West and South have passed acts protecting
existing railroads in the privilege of furnishing transportation
service. Examples are Minnesota and North Dakota, both legis-
lating in 1925, and Mississippi the same year. There seems to
be a decided trend toward the Ohio stand that competing cer-
tificates shall be reduced to an absolute minimum if not elim-
inated altogether.7 8 While these statutes aim to protect rail-
roads primarily, to do so the commissions must also protect
existing bus lines, which may be paralleling rail lines by check-
ing the granting of competing certificates.
But whether the statutes provide for the protection of exist-
ing facilities, there appears in the commission decisions as early
as 1919 a tendency to check the issuance of competing certifi-
74 Illinois Commerce Commission Law 1921, Sec. 55.
75 Re Farina's Bus Line and Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1922B, 803.
76 Re Brown, P. U. PL, 1926E, 630. Similar decision in Missouri. Re
Hatfield, case 5439 (Mo. P. S. Corm.), Jan. 5, 1928.
77 General Code, 614-87, and decisions in Notes 62 and 64.
78 But see the Texas Act (Ch. 270, General Laws of 1927, Sec. 7) deny-
ing the commission power to refuse a certificate on the ground that existing
steam and electric lines are sufficient to serve the needs. Here is an inter-
esting example of the frontier distrust of railroads.
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cates. In that year the California commission refused to grant
such a certificate where it was shown that the operator occa-
sionally had to refuse service to some because of too small equip-
ment; a period of sixty days was given the carrier in which to
improve the service, and until the end of that period the request
for a competing certificate was dismissed without prejudice.79
Three years later the policy of the commission relative to com-
peting certificates was becoming more rigid as revealed in the
ruling that a certificate will not issue where the applicant fails
to prove not only inadequacy of existing service but that new
business will be created by the issuance of the competing cer-
tificate.80
Where livery and taxi service were sufficient and the proposed
rates for motor service would be greater, the Utah commission
refused to issue the desired certificate.8 1 Motor carrier service
and train service combined being ample, no competing certificate
will issue in Colorado.8 2
4. PROBABLE FINANCIAL EFFECT OF GRANTING CERTIFICATE
A fourth factor affecting the issuance of certificates is the
financial effect which would probably result from such granting.
This effect on the applicant has not been overlooked by the com-
missions; on the contrary, they have often sought to protect
his interest against financial loss.
In Indiana and Montana, it has been held that no certificate
can be granted where applicant's traffic would be light,8 3 and in
the former state, the commission view that insufficient business
to pay operating expenses and a return on investment consti-
tuted adequate grounds for denial.8 4 A fair guarantee of ample
business to justify establishing the service was considered an
essential basis in Illinois.8 5
Failure of applicant to show that new business would be
created along the route was valid ground for refusal in Cal-
7 Re A. R. G. Bus Co., P. U. R., 1919E, 238.
8o Re Hempstead, P. U. R., 1922D, 490-91. A similar but less exacting
ruling appears in Re Starkey (California). Decision 15778, Dec. 21, 1925.
81 Re Frost, P. U. R., 1919E, 662.
82 Re Elliott, P. U. R., 1926A, 380.
83 Re Gary Co. (Ind.), Decision 620-M; Re Leslie J. Weir (Mont.),
P. U. R., 1926B, 357.
84 Re Zent, P. U. R., 1927C, XI. Similarly in Re Tilley (Colorado),
P. U. R., 1928A, 184.
8GRe Ritter, P. U. R., 1923B, 530.
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ifornia8s To the same effect runs a decision in Utah where the
business of an applicant would not justify the expense of fur-
nishing liability insurance.81 But no authorization will be given
an applicant to extend his operation merely to make the line as
a whole profitable, said the California commission.88 Granting
a certificate to compete with existing carrier whose service is
ample would be confiscatory, the traffic being insufficient to war-
rant two carriers; such commission action was illegal, concluded
the Illinois supreme court.8 9
The effect of granting a certificate on financial interests of
existent motor carriers has been up for decision in a few in-
stances. The Utah supreme court reversed the commission in
its refusal to allow a long-established operator to use more equip-
ment so as to starve out a more recently certified competitor.90
Thus was the commission checked in its denial of authority to
the prior operator to protect its interests even at the sacrifice
of its young competitor. Increased traffic resulting from re-
routing of freight justified granting the applicant a competing
certificate, but existing operator was to be protected in its inter-
mediate-point business. Priority of operation justified the con-
ditional permit, ruled the Arizona commission. 91 But public
needs outweigh financial interests of the established carrier, and
certificates have been issued for additional service in Indiana.9 2
In California, a rate of 21.09 per cent. return on depreciated
valuation, as shown by existing carrier's own accounts, was ex-
cessively high, and applicant was granted a competing certificate
for tourist service. 93
The effect of granting a certificate on the financial status of
both the existing and proposed carriers has been considered in
New York. Application for competing certificate was denied
where the business would mean ruin for applicant and existing
86 Re Hempstead, P. U. R., 1922D, 490-91.
87 Re Marchant, P. U. R., 1927C, 398-400.
s8 Re Palo Verde & Imperial Valley Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1920C,
619.
89 Superior Motor Bus Co. v. Community Motor Bus Co., P. U. R.,
1926C, 685; 150 N. E. 668. Whether existing carrier is earning a dividend
is not a relevant question in Arizona. Re Dair, P. U. R., 1927E, 463.
90 Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission, 247 Pacific 284. See Bus Age,
Feb., 1927, 44.91 Re Consolidated Stage Co., P. U. R., 1922A, 592.
92 Re Shepard, 590-M, Feb. 5, 1926. Similar decision in Re Jensen
(S. D.), Order 994-A, June 22, 1926.
93Re J. A. Boyd (Calif.), P. U. R., 1925A, 721-22.
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carrier. 94  The view was stressed by the same agency a year
later.95
Relatively little concern has been manifested by the commis-
sions in regard to the financial effect the granting of a certificate
would have on the public. Only a few instances have arisen.
Service and not rates, is of prime importance to the public.
Arizona has ruled that a proposed motor service should not
be admitted to a community unless it will be equal to or better
than existing railway service, and cost less.9 6 One of the grounds
for granting a certificate to compete with a railway which had
neglected to make its service adequate was the applicant's show-
ing that he would charge no more, probably less, than the rail-
way 7 The same commission allowed a certificate to compete
with a railway partly because the applicant's rates would be
lower than those of the American Railway Express.9 8 A cer-
tificate was granted in New York where the applicant would
charge higher than the railway, and would require longer time
for the trip, the railway station being some two miles distant,
while the motor carrier practically delivered the passengers to
their door.99 But Utah has denied a motor carrier certificate
where rates would be higher than those charged by livery and
taxis. 0 0
5. FINANCIAL ABILITY Op APPLICANT
Financial ability of the applicant to furnish proper service is
taken into account in granting a certificate. Sometimes statutes
specify this factor ;101 more often the matter enters into what
the commission considers the demand of public necessity. The
test of financial ability is stressed by commissions generally.
Illustrative cases have arisen in New York, Indiana, Illinois,
Iowa, and Colorado.
94Re Gaiser, P. U. R., 1918E, 927. Likewise Re Lyman (Utah), P.
U. R., 1919B, 101-6.
95 Re Blevins, P. U. R., 1919F, 58.
O6 Re Turner, P. U. R., 1922B, 760. But assurance that fares will be
cheaper is insufficient evidence on which to base a competitive certificate
in Colorado. Re Townsend, P. U. R., 1928A, 181.
97 Re ReX (Calif.), P. U. R., 1920B, 675.
98 Re Oakland San Jose Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1920A, 925.
DORe Demoney (N. Y. P. S. Com.), P. U. R., 1920C, 402.
00 Re Frost (Utah), P. U. R., 1919E, 662.
10 For example, Ohio General Code, 614-690; Oregon, Laws, 1925, Ch.
380, Sec. 5.
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In the first state the lack of sufficient funds to finance the
proposed operation caused the denial of the certificate, and un-
certainty of financial ability led to the same conclusion in an-
other state.102  Financial ability of applicant showing his de-
pendability to furnish proper service has again convinced the
New York commission.'03 Reasonable requirements in Illinois
include financial ability of applicant. 04 Financial weakness has
proved an influential factor in determining an application in
Idiana.10 The established financial ability of a railroad has
been considered valid basis for granting a certificate to its sub-
sidiary in Iowa; 0 6 and in other states especially of the North-
east. Failure to show financial standing sufficient to furnish de-
pendable service was grounds for denial in Colorado. 1°7 The
commission in this state has also ruled that the financial respon-
sibility of a motor carrier subsidiary of a railroad must be
guaranteed by the railroad company, and the commission incor-
porated into the certificate a provision for revocation for failure
of parent company to so guarantee. 08
Public convenience and necessity demands that the applicant
be financially able to furnish service and the commissions are
observing that demand.
6. POPULAR PREFERENCE FOR MOTOR SERVICE
Popular preference for motor service has proved an effective
factor in commission decisions interpreting public convenience
and necessity: This popular preference, which can be observed
anywhere, rests upon a multifold basis.
Advantages enjoyed by motor passenger service over rail
service are primarily these: (1) More flexibility and frequency
of service; (2) a nearer completion of the trip; (3) deconcentra-
tion of population by easily extending to suburban, residential
102 Re Buffalo Jitney Owners Assoc., P. U. R., 19?s3C, 645; Re Rhoney,
P. U. R., 1923D, 623.
103 Last case in Note 102.
104 Re Ritter (Ill.), P. U. R., 1923B, 530. Same factor later stressed
by the commission. Re Chicago-Joliet Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1928A,
107.
105 Re Spencer-Martinsville Motor Line (Ind.), Decision 589-M, Jan.
22, 1926.
106 Re Fort Dodge, D. M. & S. Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1926C, 27.
107 Re Walker, P. U. R., 1927C, 396, Dec. 7, 1926.
1O8 Re Denver & Interurban Motor Co. (Colorado), Dec., 1338, June 24,
1927.
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areas; (4) fact that the bus often goes through more attractive
sections of the country and city than does the railway; (5) abil-
ity to do much to satisfy the present day craze to ride on
rubber. 0 9
The evidence of the above points is so clear as to require no
discussion to establish them as the basis of popular preference
for passenger service. Add to these the advantages offered by
the motor truck, such as pick-up loading and door delivery; and
prompt and speedy service for delivering perishable products
and emergency orders, and you have established the unassailable
bulwark of popular preference for motor service so character-
istic of the present time.
While it cannot be said that popular preference has become
the chief factor actuating commissions in granting certificates,
it has nevertheless proved an important one. As early as 1917
the New York commission, in a city case in which the bus had
carried 770,000 passengers in fifteen months, concluded that
most of those would ride the street car were no motor carrier
service offered."10 Greater convenience of passengers in board-
ing and alighting from motor vehicles than from boats, and the
greater convenience afforded by near-home unloading of pas-
sengers as against the railway with its station far from the
center of town was accepted by the New York commission as
powerful elements in popular preference for motor service."'
A petitioner's offering ample evidence that popular preference
demands motor transportation proved sufficient basis for a cer-
tificate for motor service on a route already adequately served
by two railways."12
Perhaps the most extreme case of popular preference is that
decided in New York, September 1, 1926. A certificate was
granted for motor passenger service competing with the New
York Central and the Lehigh Valley, the former furnishing
twelve trains daily each way and the latter six daily each way.1 8
109 See address of F. J. Scarr before Bus Division of A. A. A. at Phila-
delphia, June 15-16, 1927, Bus Transportation, July, 1927, 379-81.
110 Re Troy Auto Car Co., P. U. R., 1917A, 700. One commissioner, in
a lengthy opinion, dissented, contending that the street railway should not
be forced to submit to loss of revenue which would result from competing
motor carrier.
Ill Re Gaiser, P. U. R., 1920B, 246.
112 Re Denver-Colorado Springs-Pueblo Motorway (Colorado), Dec., 963,
April 21, 1926.
113 Re International Bus Corporation, P. U. R., 1927A, 346.
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Community need for sending and receiving goods the same
day has justified establishing a motor truck service in Colo-
rado."14
Sometimes, however, popular preference as introduced has
been set aside by the commission in favor of other factors. This
happened in Arizona in 1922 where the applicant based his claim
on the fact that his proposed through service would eliminate
the necessity of passengers getting out of one vehicle and into
another at a junction point, the commission holding that pas-
sengers would both welcome and benefit by an opportunity to
"stretch out" for a few minutes.1 15 Substantially the same con-
clusion was reached by the California commission." 16
Early in 1927 the New York commission refused a certificate
where to grant it would seriously affect revenues of the rail
carrier, although there existed strong popular preference for
motor service. 1 7
7. MISCELLANEOUS FACTORS
That experience and skill in transportation service are of par-
ticular value in determining applications is attested by rulings
in several states, notably Maine,"18 Illinois,1 9 California,120 Colo-
rado, 121 and Iowa. 22 In a majority of the cases in these states,
railroads were involved, and the decisions protected them.
Other miscellaneous factors influencing decisions on appli-
cations for certificate include the residence of applicant beyond
the boundaries of the state in which he seeks authority to oper-
ate, congestion of traffic on thoroughfares, and social and edu-
cational benefits resulting.
Indiana has refused a certificate to one Howard, a citizen of
114 Curnow Livery and Transfer Co., Decision 873, May 6, 1926.
15 Re Bisbee-Tueson Stage Line, P. U. R., 1922B, 764.
116 Re Auto Transit Co., Decision 16609 (Cal. R. R. Com.), May 3, 1926.
117 Re Northport Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1927C, 605, March 23,
1927.
11 Re Maine Motor Coaches (Me. P. U. Com.), P. U. R., 1926B, 561.
119 Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee R. Co. (Ill.), P. U. R., 19230,
61. Re Ritter, P. U. R., 1923B, 530; East St. Louis & S. R. Co., decided
Feb. 9, 1926.
120 Re Balish, P. U. R., 1928E, 136.
121 Re Wood (Colorado), Ibid.
12 2 Re Fort Dodge, D. Al. & Southern Transportation Co., P. U. R.,
1926C, 27.
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Kentucky, on the grounds that the statute 2 3 limited the issuance
of licenses and permits for public utilities to "corporations or-
ganized under the laws of Indiana or to a citizen of such state."
In the same state the fact that a highway is already heavily con-
gested served as basis for denial of certificate to operate in a
thinly settled region along the way. Here public necessity enters
in in both a negative and a positive sense. 124 But Arizona has
cast aside the congestion of traffic on a city street as insufficient
grounds for denial of certificate, 125 and Massachusetts has
reached the same conclusion. 126
Benefits of a general social nature will result from attracting
tourists to different parts of the state, and a certificate to pro-
vide the necessary transportation service has been issued in New
Hampshire. 127 Circulation of news bears sufficient relation to
general welfare to justify a certificate for service to deliver
newspapers in Arizona. 128
Illegal operation after effective date of regulatory law has
served as a factor in determining application made later by the
illegal operator. In Montana it has been declared that repeated
violations of the law requiring certificates are sufficient grounds
for denying applicant when he does apply. 129 In this case the
applicant did not seek a certificate till another party had secured
one for the route. Applicant before the commission testified that
he had been unable to find the commission inspector with whom
to file application. The commission in this case frowned upon
an effort to seek protection of the regulatory law which appli-
cant had so recently flouted.
The applicant cannot secure a certificate on the plea that while
he has been observing the law others have been violating it, ac-
cording to the Colorado commission.' 3 0 Nor can an illegal oper-
123 Re Howard, P. U. R., 1926D, 365. Rhode Island has a provision
similar to that in Indiana. R. I. Laws, Ch. 221, Sess. 1922, Sec. 3. Rhode
Island requires U. S. citizenship. Re Labelle, P. U. R., 1928A, 474. But
the Indiana requirement of Indiana citizenship cannot be required of him
who seeks to do interstate business. Re Gold Seal Transit Co., P. U. R.,
1927D, 166.
124 Re Gary Ry. Co. (Ind.), Dec., 587-M.
125 Re Phoenix Motor Coach, P. U. R., 1925E, 343.
126 Re N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., P. U. R., 1926D, 159.
127 Re B. & M. Transportation Co., Order 1712, July 17, 1925.
128 Be Arizona Gazette, P. U. R., 1922C, 677-81.
129 Re Leslie J. Weir, P. U. R., 1926B, 335.
130 Re Paradox Land and Transport Co., P. U. R., 1924E, 579. See
also Re Reeder (Ind.), Decision 818-M, Feb. 3, 1928.
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ator neglectful of public needs secure a certificate in the state of
Washington. 31
A position much to be emulated by commissions in dealing
with recalcitrant illegal operators has been taken by the Cal-
ifornia commission.13 2 An illegal operator, finally before the
commission, pleaded that his disregard of the commission order
to cease operation was due to the advice of a fellow truckman
that he (the petitioner) was not within the scope of the order.
In rejecting this plea and denying a certificate to the petitioner,
the commission admonished him in substantially these words:
"It is by far better to do as the commission orders, since it is
busy interpreting the law and is therefore more capable of giv-
ing advice than is a fellow truckman or other person with ul-
terior motives or interested reasons for giving erroneous advice.
It ought to be common knowledge that operation without a cer-
tificate is illegal, for the act has been in operation four years,
and the maxim of 'Ignorance of the law excuses no one' should
be applied."
But there are sometimds mitigating circumstances. This fact
is recognized by the Colorado commission in granting a certifi-
cate to an applicant who before the time he applied had begun
carrying passengers during the inability of a railway to supply
normal service. The railway did not object at the time the ap-
plicant began supplementing the impaired railway service, and
the commission ruled that the railway protest against the grant-
ing of a certificate to make permanent the motor service so
begun could not stand.1 3 It has been decided in Montana that
where discontinuance of illegally begun service will hurt ship-
pers, the applicant must be granted a certificate. 134 Thus was
recognized the ultimate primary consideration of public con-
venience and not private gain.
In case there are two or more applicants for a certificate over
the same route, what factors guide the commission in making a
choice? Statutes frequently specify elements to be considered
by the commission in deciding to grant or refuse a certificate,
but they are conspicuously silent on instructions governing selec-
131 Re Knulhnan (Wash. Dept. of P. W.), P. U. R., 1921E, 842.
13 2 Re L. A. Jones, P. U. R., 1921D, 684.
133 Re Carver, P. U. R., 1923B, 242.
134 Montana Bd. of Railroad Commissioners, Report and Order 1450,
July 21, 1926; P. U. R., 1927A, 94.
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tion between applicants. However, the South Dakota act of
1925 does prescribe in some detail directions for such a case.
On December 31, 1927, a commission selected the widow of a
deceased certificate holder on grounds of length of time the
service had been in operation, character of the service furnished,
and amount of capital invested. 135
Some commissions have shown a marked preference for the
railway applicant where two or more applicants seek the cer-
tificate for motor service over the same route. While this ques-
tion of the relation between the motor carrier and the rail car-
rier is of tremendous practical importance, 13 6 it is proper to
state here that the evidence accumulating in the last twelve
months shows a much more definite trend than ever toward
favoring the rail line. 3 7
Frequently priority in filing application for certificate has ap-
peared as a factor. A widely varying attitude has been taken in
different states toward this element. It has proved the determin-
ing factor in Indiana, where the certificate went to the applicant
who had observed the law by not beginning operation contrary
to the law.138 Where both applicants are morally fit and finan-
cially able, the Colorado commission has awarded the certificate
to him who filed first.13 9 Other considerations being equal, pri-
ority in filing has secured the certificate in California,40 and a
similar ruling was made in Washington early in 1928.141 Finan-
cial ability being equal, the Colorado commission awarded the
certificate to the applicant who filed first.142 In Kentucky it is
primarily a matter of filing first which determines the selection
between applicants, so long as each is capable of performing the
stipulations of the certificate. 14 3 The South Dakota commission
135Re Transportation Co., P. U. R., 1928C, 110.
136 See George, Motor Carrier Regulation in the United States, chapter
on Motor Carriers and Rail Carriers.
137 The most instructive illustration of this trend recently is to be found
in California, Re Balish, P. U. R., 1928E, 136; Re Pacific Electric Railway
Co., Ibid.; and Re United Stages, P. U. R., 1928E, 137. In the last case
the certificate was awarded the motor applicant. Rates figured prominently
in these last two cases.
138 Re Smallwood (Ind. P. S. Com.). Decided August 14, 1925.
139 Re Armentrout, P. U. R., 1927C, XII-XIII.
140 Re Gibson, P. U. R., 1926A, 833.
141 Re Krakenberger, P. U. R., 1928C, 233.
142 Re Armentrout, P. U. R., 1927E, 728.
143 See my article in National Municipal Review, Sept., 1927, 568-71.
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has repeatedly put emphasis on priority in filing as the deter-
mining factor. 44
A non-committal attitude toward priority in filing has been
taken by the Nevada commission. Reliance should be put on
this factor only in case of last resort, especially where the appli-
cations were filed about the same time.145 Since in this case one
application had been filed by letter and two by telegraph all the
same day, the letter being posted before the telegrams were dis-
patched, the commission might have found no little technical
difficulty in determining which really had priority. Later this
commission rated priority in filing not higher than of secondary
importance. 14 6
The trend in some sections, however, is definitely against
viewing priority in filing as the determining factor. Indirectly
the New York commission thus inclined in 1919.147 Similarly
the Washington agency passed over this element, chose the sec-
ond applicant in order of filing, and the state supreme court
upheld this action. 148 In Ohio the commission is under no obli-
gation to consider priority in filing,149 and the supreme court in
that state has ruled that priority in filing confers no right to
secure the certificate. 150
Where two carriers have established service prior to the regu-
latory act, the priority in beginning that service has come up
in deciding between the applicants for the certificate. The South
Dakota statute stresses priority in establishing service;151 in
Nevada this factor rates higher than priority in filing applica-
tion for certificate. 152 Priority in establishing service is recog-
nized as important in New York. 153 Priority in commission in-
vestigation of the merits of the respective applications has been
ruled out as a factor in California. 154
144Re MoMurray, P. U. R., 1926D, 785; Re Black Hills Bus Co., de-
cided June 1, 1926; Re Winner-Hot Springs Transit Co., same day; likewise
Re Lewis, P. U. R., 1928A, 246.
145 Re Morris, P. U. R., 1922B, 461.
146 P. U. R., 1922C, 734.
147 Re Joseph Carlucci, P. U. R., 1919F, 704.
148 Auto Freight Case, 214 Pacific 164.
149 Cincinnati Law Review, May, 1927, 311.
150 Sohngen v. Pub. Utils. Com, 154 N. E. 734. See Bus Age, May,
1927, 34.
151 Laws of 1925, H. B. 118, Sec. 14.
152 Note 145.
153 Note 147.
154 Note 140.
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Thus the claim of priority as brought before the regulatory
bodies has involved three different meanings, relating to filing
of application, establishment of service, and commission investi-
gation of applications.
Public convenience and public service in that more of the
traffic was destihed to the terminus of one applicant served as
the decisive factor in Arizona. 13 5 The applicant offering service
at the lower cost has been selected in Nevada,156 and in the same
state more ample facilities proposed and financial ability to
furnish that service have secured the certificate. 15 7 Illinois also
has recognized the greater financial ability of one applicant as
a ground for awarding the certificate. 158 Cost of the service has
played a part in Colorado. 1 9
Experience and skill in transporting service, even in operating
a motor truck under private contract, the Utah commission ad-
mits 1o as valuable in deciding between applicants. Experience,
skill and business ability are powerful factors in Illinois.' 6 '
Character and standing of the applicants have appeared as in-
fluential factors in selecting between applicants. The fact that
one applicant had observed the legal requirements relative to
beginning the service was recognized as a strong point in his
favor by the Indiana commission. 16 2 Illegal operation so stamped
the character of the applicant in Washington that he was denied
the certificate, 1 3 and where the commission questioned seriously
whether the applicant meant to operate the proposed service
himself he w~s denied the certificate in Colorado.6 4
Derogatory- suggestions as to the character of the applicant
cannot be considered by the Montana commission when those
suggestions are handed in secretly or whispered to the commis-
sion.165 Mere charges that the applicant is guilty of reckless
driving and of violating the prohibition laws do not disqualify
15- P. U. R., 1926D, 571.
156 P. U. R., 1922C, 734.
157 Ibid.
158 Re Austem Brothers Transfer Co., P. U. R., 1923C, 222.
155 Re King, P. U. R., 1919F, 377.
1130 Re Russel, P. U. R., 1927C, 400.
161 Note 158. See also P. U. R., 1928A, 107.
162 Note 138.
163 Note 141.
104 Re Hall, P. U. R., 1928A, 655.
165 Re Butte-Anacond Freight Express Service, P. U. R., 1926C, 495.
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him from receiving the certificate in Missouri. 166 The commis-
sion here ruled that the court decisions evidencing the guilt of
applicant are necessary to disqualify him thus. Where the ap-
plicant's manner of testifying was such as to create doubt that
he would observe the law, he was denied the certificate.167 The
applicant preferred by the community has been selected by the
Ohio commission in preference to the applicant who was an-
tagonistic to the community.168 The authority of the commis-
sion to select between applicants and an order choosing one of
two applicants have been affirmed by the supreme court of
Ohio.169
166 Re Packard, P. U. R., 1928C, 189.
167 Davis, Case 5479, December 19, 1927.
168 Merryman v. Moore, 1924, P. U. R., 49. See Cincinnati Law Review,
May, 1927, 311.
169 Johnson v. Pub. Utils. Com. (0. Sup. Ct.), 157 N. E. 475.
